

ISRAEL'S BORDERS & NATIONHOOD HISTORY

A Generalized Summary of Events & Peoples

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FOREWORD

This review of the history of Israel's borders and nationhood and how Israel came to exist was initiated for personal reasons to help the author better understand the dynamics of how Israel arose from the many districts of the Ottoman Empire after its collapse after World War I, and then how the dynamics of the region's peoples and world politics played a role in the formation of the borders, and thus the nation of Israel.

The paper can be described purely as a much generalized summary of many complicated events over the last nearly 100 years. There are a number of significant events and situations that contributed to the formation of Israel, but their detail was avoided in order to ensure the focus was purely on the actual events that created the various configuration of Israel's 'official' borders over this period. There are other works that go into far more detail, so if this paper peaks an interest, perhaps a visit to those many works would be a valuable exercise.

To assist the reader, the sources used are listed herein at the end. All of the source material is from internet sites that are devoted to the history of Israel and the people that were a part of the evolution of Israel. The URL of each website is provided for convenience. Maps were acquired from various sites not listed, but were verified through other sources. Selection was predicated on the quality of the map.

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Fact: There is already an independent state established for the Arabs who refer to themselves as Palestinian, it's called Jordan, as this paper will show. The areas of the Middle East where modern day Israel, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and other nations are located were part of the Ottoman Empire from 1517 to 1917. Map 1 shows the geographical expanse of the Ottoman Empire in 1914 just as WWI began.



Map 1


After WWI, there was a partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, which was a dynamic process that took place between October 1918 and November 1922. In effect, it was a series of political events/decisions that divided the huge conglomeration of Ottoman Empire territories and peoples into several new territories. This partitioning ushered in the geographical structure that forms the modern Arab world today, including the Republic of Turkey, which was formerly the regional-seat of the Ottoman Empire. This partitioning by the League of Nations granted France the mandates over Syria and Lebanon, and granted the United Kingdom mandates over Mesopotamia (later renamed Iraq) and Palestine (later divided into two new territories Arab Palestine and Jewish Palestine; see Map 2).

Britain would 'administer' this region continuously from 1920 to 1948. Although not a focus of this historical summarization, the remainder of the Ottoman Empire's land possessions on Arabian Peninsula became the Kingdom of Hejaz and Sultanate of Nejd (today Saudi Arabia), the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, and the other Arab States of the Persian Gulf today.



Map 2

These 'territories' were created in 1918, and served as the governing structure for these territories until the League of Nations became further involved with the partitioning of the areas. The League of Nations in September 1922 created the British Mandate for



Map 3

Palestine. As part of this mandate, Winston Churchill's Cairo 1922 White Paper recommendations were included, which called for the partition of the Palestine Mandate

region into two parts, Palestine (Jewish-23% of the Mandate area lying west of the River Jordan) and Palestine (Arab-77% of the Mandate area lying east of the Jordan River); see Map 3.

The League of Nations designated the Jewish Palestine for the sole purpose of providing for a place for a Jewish Homeland, but not a State. This is the land area that we today know of today collectively as three (3) political geographical areas: Israel, the West Bank and Gaza. The creation of the Jewish Palestine has its roots in a 1918 agreement between Chaim Weizmann and Emir Faisal Hussein (King of Iraq and Syria). To understand the importance of this agreement, some background regarding King Feisal and that agreement is essential.

King Feisal Hussein

Feisal was an extremely prominent Arab, He was the son of Hussein, Sherif of Mecca, and had led the Arab intifada against Turkey during the 1916-1918 periods. He became the King of Syria, and as such was also the first Arab to be sympathetic to the establishment of a Jewish homeland. This was predicated on the fact that by the mid-19th Century, up to 100,000 people lived in Palestine, including a high percentage of Jews, whose forebears had lived there for over 3500 years. In 1882, roughly 200,000 Muslims live in western Palestine (west of the Jordan River, now called Jordan), and by 1918, that had not changed. Because of this population structure, both King Faisal of Iraq, and his father, Hussein ibn-Ali, Sherif of Mecca, endorsed and extolled the Balfour Declaration (the partitioning of Palestine into a Jewish Palestine and Arab Palestine).

Consider the words of Feisal's father, Hussein ibn-Ali, Sherif of Mecca, which he wrote in Mecca's *Al Qibla* in 1918:

"The resources of the country are still virgin soil and will be developed by the Jewish immigrants. One of the most amazing things until recent times was that the Palestinian used to leave his country, wandering over the high seas in every direction. His native soil could not retain a hold on him. At the same time, we have seen the Jews from foreign countries streaming to Palestine from Russia, Germany, Austria, Spain, and America. The cause of causes could not escape those who had a gift of deeper insight. They knew that the country was for its original sons [*abna'ih-i-l-asliy*in], for all their differences, a sacred and beloved homeland. The return of these exiles [*jaliya*] to their homeland will prove materially and spiritually an experimental school for their brethren who are with them in the fields, factories, trades and all things connected to the land."

Then in early 1919, King Feisal himself, the only recognized Arab leader in the world at the time, executed an agreement with Chaim Weizmann, the Chairman of the Zionist Commission of Palestine, which adopted the understanding of the Balfour Declaration. It outlined relations between a Jewish Palestine and an Arab Palestine, recognizing the former as a national home for the Jews, in which they should quickly settle. King Feisal wrote,

"We Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our delegation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday to the Zionist organization to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper."

King Feisal, in effect, believed that with the presence of a Jewish homeland, the building of his kingdom would prosper from the arrangement. The agreement effectively recognized that any Arab living in the Jewish Palestine at the time would be free to stay or relocate to the Arab Palestine, the Transjordan. However, Feisal had stipulated that if any component of the League of Nations structure for the area were revised, that he could not guarantee the agreement would be implemented. Changes were made by the League of Nations, thus the agreement was never followed through. What's important about this agreement, however, is the fact that the Chaim Weizmann, representing Zionist Jews, had agreed that any Arabs remaining in Jewish Palestine would be equals to the Jews.

The Balfour Declaration

To properly understand the role that the Balfour Declaration played in the emergence of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, this declaration needs a review. The declaration was issued in the form of a letter from the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Arthur James Balfour, to Lord Rothschild. It was then delivered to Chaim Weizmann, a Zionist activist, expressing British support for a Jewish "national home" in Jewish Palestine. Not long after the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, the British came to see that there might be an inconvenience in allowing the establishment a national home for Jews in Jewish Palestine. At the same time, Britain fell back on its word to give Syria Arab rule and gave Syria to France according an agreement known as the Sykes-Picot agreement. At this point King Feisal refused the implementation of his agreement with Weismann. Due to the resentment towards the partitioning created by the British Mandate for Palestine, riots broke out in both the Jewish and Arab Palestine territories between 1920 and 1921. The British House of Lords and House of Commons raised motions to cancel the Balfour Declaration, and even although these actions were rejected, the British realized that they would have to reach a compromise sooner or later; the world is still waiting.

Therefore, Winston Churchill, the British Colonial Secretary, was given the task of reforming the mandate in such a way that it would pacify the Arabs while keeping Palestine away from the French with the British weapon being the “establishment of a Jewish national home.” To ask for the consent of Jews and Arabs, Churchill circulated his proposed document to both before issuing it, to which Chaim Weizmann accented while the Arab representatives objected on the grounds that both the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper contradicted the promises that had been made by previously Britain.

The British White Paper of 1922, also known as the Churchill White Paper was a document drafted by Winston Churchill with the help of Sir Herbert Samuel and was issued on June 3, 1922 with the purpose of clarifying the British viewpoint regarding the Balfour Declaration.

According to the White Paper, Britain would stand by the terms of the Balfour Declaration and that this declaration, which was approved at the San Remo Conference and in the Treaty of Sevres, would not change. The White Paper recognized the progress that the Zionist community was making, but made it clear that the Britain did not support the idea of a Jewish national home and would like to see it as only a “community” within the Jewish Palestine territory. Moreover, in July 1922, the British made a partition in the Palestine Mandate by separating the territory lying east of the Jordan River from the Jewish populated area and renaming it Transjordan, giving it to Emir Abdullah to rule; see Map 4. This in effect split the original territory of Palestine into a 23% for the Jews and 77% for the Arabs.

In effect, this was a precursor to the establishment of a Jewish State and an Arab Palestinian State. It should be noted here that at no time during this process were the Arabs in Jewish Palestine ever referred to as Palestinians, only as Arabs.



Map 4

The document also stated that Arabs had misinterpreted the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence and a reported position by the British “that an independent national (Jewish) government should be at once established in (Jewish) Palestine.” The paper also stated that they do not wish that Jewish Palestine become “as Jewish as England is English.” A new stipulation for the immigration quota of Jews into Palestine was also established in the paper which confirmed that the maximum limit of immigration was not to exceed the absorptive capacity of economic state of the country. Thus, at this point, Britain was not in favor of establishing a new State of Israel.

The UN Partition Plan for Palestine of 1947

The United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine recommended another geographical partition of Palestine to be implemented upon the termination of the British Palestine Mandate. On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution recommending the adoption and implementation of this plan as Resolution 181(II).

The resolution recommended the creation of independent Arab and Jewish territories within Jewish Palestine and a Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem. The Partition Plan, a four-part document attached to the resolution, provided for the termination of the 1922 British Mandate for Palestine, the progressive withdrawal of British armed forces and the delineation of boundaries between the two States and Jerusalem. Part I of the Plan stipulated that the Mandate would be terminated as soon as possible and the United Kingdom would withdraw no later than 1 August 1948. The new independent territories would come into existence two months after the withdrawal, but no later than 1 October 1948. The Plan sought to address the conflicting objectives and claims of two competing movements: Arab nationalism and Jewish nationalism, the latter known as Zionism. The Plan also called for *Economic Union* between the proposed territories, and for the protection of religious and minority rights.

The Plan was accepted by the Jewish public, except for its fringes, and by the Jewish Agency despite its perceived limitations. With a few exceptions, the Arab leaders and governments rejected the plan of partition in the resolution and indicated an unwillingness to accept any form of territorial division. Their reason was that it violated the principles of national self-determination in the UN charter which granted people the right to decide their own destiny.

Immediately after adoption of the Resolution by the General Assembly, a civil war broke out. The partition plan was *not implemented*.

The Jewish state as proposed in the 1947 partition plan did not add significantly to the arable land for the Jews, which was regarded as too little to absorb millions of expected immigrants. The proposed borders did not provide a solution to the problem of security, which became critical when the events in 1947-48 made it clear that the Jewish state

would not win an agreement from the Arabs to accept the partition. Finally, although the partition lines were drawn to ensure a Jewish majority in the Jewish state, it only provided for a 60 percent Jewish majority. Plus, the plan even specifically mentioned that the territory proposed for a Jewish homeland was intended on purpose to limit Jewish immigration in an attempt to ease the fears of the Arabs from further Jewish territorial expansion.

The willingness of the Jewish leadership to ignore these shortcomings testifies that the Zionist decision to adopt partition was based on giving top priority to the realization of a Jewish sovereign state over all other goals. Thus, it was politics, not geography, which tipped the scale toward the Zionist agreement to the UN partition plan of 1947, Resolution 181; see Map 5. This is also referred to as the “Pre-1948” borders.

Of course, we know today that these proposals for territorial separation of the Jews and the Arabs living in Jewish Palestine (the land west of the Jordan) did not lead to a solution of the




Map 5


Jewish-Arab conflict in Eretz Israel/Palestine. Because of Arab opposition within and outside Palestine, the UN partition plan was not implemented. Consequently, a de facto partition similar to the UN 1947 partition plan was implemented forcibly as the result of the 1948 war and the Armistice agreements of 1948-1949. The United States and the Soviet Union immediately recognized Israel as an independent state, and indicted the Arabs for their attack upon the Jews. Under this partition, the boundaries of the State of Israel encompassed a territory of 20,600 km, approximately 75 percent of the territory of western Eretz Israel; see Map 7 next page. As for the remaining territory, the West Bank was annexed to the Kingdom of Jordan and the Gaza Strip remained under Egyptian administration between 1947 and 1967. The partition that was carried out and held until 1967 was, in effect, not between the Jews and the 'Palestinian' Arabs, but between the Jews and the Arab states who had attacked Israel; see Map 6 of the 1948 invasion movements by surrounding Arab countries.

As a result of what Israel refers to as the 1948 War for Independence, the boundaries of Jewish lands versus that of what was erroneously referred as Palestinian lands, which were in fact, Arab lands, Map 7 on the next page illustrates how the geography of these lands changed as a result of the conflict.

The Armistice Line map of 1949 (see Map 7 next page) defined the State of Israel until the 1967 war. Somewhere during this period was born the precept of a Palestinian people; an entity that had never existed before, nor for that matter ever sanctified by any nation in the world. Thus as this history further unfolds, the references to Palestinians will become more and more prominent in the rhetoric of Arab leaders in the region.



Map 6



Map 7

In May 17, 1948, Chaim Weizmann was elected President of the Provisional Council and on February 16, 1949 (or February 17), was inaugurated as the first President of Israel.

The 1967 Six Day War – The Countdown to War

Prior to this conflict, Israel had consistently expressed publicly a desire to negotiate with its neighbors. In an address to the UN General Assembly on October 10, 1960, Foreign Minister Golda Meir challenged Arab leaders to meet with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion to negotiate a peace settlement. Egyptian President Abdel Nasser answered on October 15, 1960, saying that Israel was trying to deceive world opinion, and reiterating that his country would never recognize the Jewish State.

The Arabs were equally adamant in their refusal to negotiate a separate settlement for the refugees. As Nasser told the United Arab Republic National Assembly March 26, 1964:

“Israel and the imperialism around us, which confront us, are two separate things. There have been attempts to separate them, in order to break up the problems and present them in an imaginary light as if the problem of Israel is the problem of the refugees, by the solution of which the problem of Palestine will also be solved and no residue of the problem will remain. The danger of Israel lies in *the very existence of Israel as it is in the present and in what she represents.*

This tone or environment, along with Nasser’s statement that Egypt would never recognize a Jewish State, established in the minds of Arabs throughout the Middle East that it was the existence of Israel that is the sole problem. One result of this attitude emerged in 1963 when the Arab League decided to introduce a new weapon in its war against Israel - the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO formally came into being during a 1964 meeting of the first Palestinian Congress. Shortly thereafter, the group began to splinter into various factions. Ultimately, the largest faction, Fatah, would come to dominate the organization, and its leader, Yasser Arafat, would become the PLO chairman and most visible symbol. All the groups adhered to a set of principles laid out in the Palestine National Charter, which called for Israel's destruction.

The PLO’s belligerent rhetoric was matched by deeds. Terrorist attacks by the group grew more frequent. In 1965, 35 raids were conducted against Israel. In 1966, the number increased to 41. In just the first four months of 1967, 37 attacks were launched. The targets were always civilians.

Thus, most of the attacks involved so-called ‘Palestinian’ guerillas infiltrating Israel from Jordan, the Gaza Strip, and Lebanon. The orders and logistical support for the attacks were coming, however, from Cairo and Damascus. Nasser’s main objective

was to harass the Israelis, but he had another motive, that was to undermine King Hussein's regime in Jordan.

King Hussein, thus, viewed the PLO as both a direct and indirect threat to his power. Hussein feared that the PLO might try to depose him with Nasser's help or that the PLO's attacks on Israel would provoke retaliatory strikes by Israeli forces that could weaken his authority. By the beginning of 1967, Hussein had closed the PLO's offices in Jerusalem, arrested many of the group's members, and withdrew recognition of the organization. Nasser and his friends in the region unleashed a torrent of criticism on Hussein for betraying the Arab cause. Hussein would soon have the chance to redeem himself.

This more or less is what set the stage for the 1967 outbreak of hostilities in the Sinai and in the West Bank areas.

On another front for Israel, the breakup of the U.A.R. and the resulting political instability only made Syria more hostile toward Israel. Another major cause of conflict was Syria's resistance to Israel's creation of a National Water Carrier to take water from the Jordan River to supply all of Israel. The Syrian army began using the Golan Heights, which tower 3,000 feet above the Galilee, to shell Israeli farms and villages. Syria's attacks grew more frequent in 1965 and 1966, and with an intensity that forced children living on kibbutzim in the Huleh Valley to sleep in bomb shelters. Israel repeatedly protested the Syrian bombardments to the UN's Mixed Armistice Commission, which was charged with policing the cease-fire; the UN did nothing to stop Syria's aggression. Even a mild Security Council resolution expressing "regret" for such incidents was vetoed by the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, Israel was condemned by the United Nations when it retaliated.

While the Syrian military bombardment and terrorist attacks intensified, Nasser's rhetoric became increasingly threatening. In 1965, he announced, "We shall not enter 'Palestine' with its soil covered in sand; we shall enter it with its soil saturated in blood.

Again, a few months later, Nasser expressed the Arabs' aspiration for,

"the full restoration of the rights of the 'Palestinian' people. In other words, we aim at the destruction of the state of Israel. The immediate aim is perfection of Arab military might. The national aim is the eradication of Israel."

Syria's attacks on Israeli kibbutzim from the Golan Heights finally provoked a retaliatory strike by Israel on April 7, 1967. During the attack, Israeli planes shot down six Syrian fighter planes (MIG jets supplied by the Soviet Union). Shortly thereafter, the Soviets, who had been providing military and economic assistance to both Syria and Egypt, gave Damascus false information alleging a massive Israeli military buildup in preparation for an attack. Despite Israeli denials, Syria decided to invoke its defense treaty with Egypt and asked Nasser to come to its aid.

Thus, on May 15, Israel's Independence Day, Egyptian troops began moving into the Sinai and massing near the Israeli border. By May 18, Syrian troops were prepared for battle along the Golan Heights. Nasser ordered the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), stationed in the Sinai since 1956 as a buffer between Israeli and Egyptian forces after Israel's withdrawal following the Sinai Campaign, to withdraw on May 16. This action was taken without bringing the matter to the attention of the General Assembly (as his predecessor had promised), Secretary-General U Thant complied with the demand. After the withdrawal of the UNEF, the Voice of the Arabs radio station proclaimed on May 18, 1967:

“As of today, there no longer exists an international emergency force to protect Israel. We shall exercise patience no more. We shall not complain any more to the UN about Israel. The sole method we shall apply against Israel is total war, which will result in the extermination of Zionist existence.”

An enthusiastic echo was heard May 20 from Syrian Defense Minister Hafez Assad, who stated:

“Our forces are now entirely ready not only to repulse the aggression, but to initiate the act of liberation itself, and to explode the Zionist presence in the Arab homeland. The Syrian army, with its finger on the trigger, is united....I, as a military man, believe that the time has come to enter into a battle of annihilation.”

On May 22, Egypt closed the Straits of Tiran to all Israeli shipping and all ships bound for Eilat. This blockade cut off Israel's only supply route with Asia and stopped the flow of oil from its main supplier, Iran.

U. S. President Lyndon Johnson expressed the belief that the Egypt's blockade of the Straits of Tiran was illegal and unsuccessfully tried to organize an international flotilla to

test it. If a single act of folly was more responsible for the explosion of war between Israel and Egypt, this act more than any other was at fault. The right of innocent maritime passage must be preserved for all nations.

Nasser challenged Israel to fight almost daily.

"Our basic objective will be the destruction of Israel. The Arab people want to fight," he said on May 27. The following day, Nasser added: "We will not accept any...coexistence with Israel...today the issue is not the establishment of peace between the Arab states and Israel...the war with Israel has been in effect since 1948."

King Hussein of Jordan signed a defense pact with Egypt on May 30. Nasser then announced:

"The armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon are poised on the borders of Israel...to face the challenge, while standing behind us are the armies of Iraq, Algeria, Kuwait, Sudan and the whole Arab nation. This act will astound the world. Today they will know that the Arabs are arranged for battle, the critical hour has arrived. We have reached the stage of serious action and not declarations."


Also, President Abdur Rahman Aref of Iraq joined in the war of words:

"The existence of Israel is an error which must be rectified. This is our opportunity to wipe out the ignominy which has been with us since 1948. Our goal is clear -- to wipe Israel off the map."


On June 4, Iraq joined the military alliance with Egypt, Jordan and Syria

The Arab rhetoric was matched by the mobilization of Arab forces. Approximately 465,000 troops, more than 2,800 tanks, and 800 aircraft ringed Israel. By this time, Israeli forces had been on alert for three weeks. The country could not indefinitely remain fully mobilized, nor could it allow its sea lane through the Gulf of Aqaba to be interdicted. Israel decided to preempt the obvious impending Arab attack. To do this successfully, Israel needed the element of surprise. Had it waited for an Arab invasion, Israel would have been at a potentially catastrophic disadvantage. On June 5, Prime Minister Eshkol gave the order to attack Egypt.

Thus, this is the run up to the 1967 Six Day War where Israel found itself in an untenable position with Arab nations massing their armies on three primary fronts, Egypt on its southern border, the Sinai, Jordan on its eastern border in the West Bank, and Syria on its northeastern border in the Golan Heights. See Maps 8 (the Egyptian Front) and Map 9 (the Battle of Jerusalem) on the next page to provide some oversight to the geography of the war, and Map 10 provides the results of the Six Day War and the resulting borders of Israel in 1967.



Map 8



Map 9

After just six days of fighting, Israel had defeated the armies and air forces of Syria, Jordan and Egypt, and the Israeli forces were in a position to march on Cairo, Damascus, and Amman. However, by this time, the principal objectives of capturing the Sinai, the Golan Heights and Jerusalem had been accomplished; Israeli political leaders had no desire to fight in the Arab capitals. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had become increasingly alarmed by the Israeli advances and was threatening to intervene. A cease fire was agreed to.

By the end of the war, Israel had conquered enough territory to more than triple the size of the area it controlled, from 8,000 to 26,000 square miles. The victory enabled Israel to unify Jerusalem. Also, the Israeli forces had also captured the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank; see Map 10 next page for the borders of Israel immediately after the 1967 Six Day War.

Israel now would govern more than three-quarters of a million Arab 'palestinians', most of whom were hostile to the government, and would remain so. Nevertheless, more than 9,000 'palestinian' families were reunited in 1967. Ultimately, more than 60,000 'palestinians' returned to Israel after leaving in advance of the Six Day War.

In November 1967, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 242, which established a formula for Arab-Israeli peace. This resolution has served as the basis for peace negotiations from that time on, but more on that later on.

Israel's leaders fully expected to negotiate a peace agreement with their neighbors that would involve some territorial compromise. Therefore, instead of annexing the West Bank into the State of Israel, a military administration was created. Thus, the West Bank to this day is considered "occupied" territory; as a result it does not enjoy the same rights and privileges that the Arabs living within the formal State of Israel enjoy.

UN Resolution 242.

Because it is important to understand just how the 1967 borders became 'etched in stone' but also so controversial, it is essential to understand the rather ambiguous 'diplomatese' wording of its text and provisions.

So, it was on November 22, 1967 that the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 242, establishing the principles that were to guide the negotiations for an Arab-Israeli peace settlement. This resolution was a tortuously negotiated compromise between competing proposals. By examining what was discarded as well as the language that appears, it is possible to discern the Security Council's intent.

The first point addressed by the resolution is the "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war." Some people read 242 as though it ends here and the case for requiring a total Israeli withdrawal from the territories is proven. On the contrary, the officials that composed this clause declare that it does no such thing. It is argued that the reference clearly applies only to an offensive war. If not, the resolution would provide an incentive



Cease-Fire Lines After the Six-Day War

Map 10

for aggression. If one country attacks another, and the defender repels the attack and acquires territory in the process, the former interpretation would require the defender to return the land it took. Thus, aggressors would have little to lose because they would be insured against the main consequence of defeat – loss of territory. The ultimate goal of 242, as expressed in paragraph 3, is the achievement of a "peaceful and accepted settlement."

The most controversial clause in Resolution 242 is the call for the "Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict." This is linked to the second unambiguous clause calling for "termination of all claims or states of belligerency" and the recognition that "every State in the area" has the "right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force." The Arabs objected to the word "all" being left out, and declared that they would always read the resolution as if it included the word "all." The British Ambassador who drafted the approved resolution, Lord Caradon, declared after the vote: "It is only the resolution that will bind us, and we regard its wording as clear."

This literal interpretation was repeatedly declared to be the correct one by those involved in drafting the resolution. On October 29, 1969, for example, the British Foreign Secretary told the House of Commons the withdrawal envisaged by the resolution would not be from "all the territories." When asked to explain the British position later, Lord Caradon said: "It would have been wrong to demand that Israel return to its positions of June 4, 1967, because those positions were undesirable and artificial."

Similarly, Ambassador Goldberg explained: "The notable omissions, which were not accidental in regards to withdrawal of the words 'the' or 'all' and 'the June 5, 1967 lines', the resolution speaks of withdrawal from occupied territories purposely without defining the extent of withdrawal."

Resolution 242 clearly called on the Arab states to make peace with Israel. The principal condition is that Israel withdraw from "territories occupied" in 1967, which means that Israel must withdraw from some, all, or none of the territories still occupied. Since Israel withdrew from 91% of the territories when it gave up the Sinai, it has in all actuality, if not wholly, fulfilled its obligation under Resolution 242. The Resolution does not make Israeli withdrawal a prerequisite for Arab action. Moreover, it does not specify how much territory Israel is required to give up. The Security Council did not say Israel must withdraw from "all the" territories occupied after the Six Day War. This wording was quite deliberate. Much, if not in all probability regarding the differences between Israel

and the Palestinian Authority continues to be knotted up in this war-of-words created by Resolution 242.

Furthermore, the so-called 'Palestinians' are not mentioned anywhere in Resolution 242. They are only "alluded" to in the 2nd Article of Resolution 242, which calls for "a just settlement of the refugee problem." Nowhere does it require that 'Palestinians' be given any political rights or territory, or even be named as such. In fact, the use of the generic term "refugee" was a deliberate acknowledgement that there are "two refugee problems" produced by the conflict, one Arab and the other Jewish. In the case of the latter, almost as many Jewish-Palestinians fled Arab countries as Arab-Palestinians left Israel. The Jews, however, were never compensated by the Arab States, nor were any UN organizations ever established to help them.

The Countdown to the Yom Kippur War of 1973

After the exhilaration of the victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, Israelis became increasingly dispirited. The growing level of terrorism, combined with increasingly ominous threats from Egypt, made peace seem further away than ever. Rather than reconciling themselves to the fact that Israel's existence had more or less been guaranteed, the Arab states were in the process of looking for a way to avenge the humiliation of their defeat. The Soviet Union was also doing its share to stoke the flames of war by pouring arms into the region. And the Arab states in the Persian Gulf were beginning to take greater control of their oil resources and use the revenues to flex their political muscle.

In 1971, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat raised the possibility of signing an agreement with Israel, provided that the territories captured by the Israelis would be returned. Such a suggestion was a non-starter from Israel's perspective. And of course, Sadat knew he could not negotiate an agreement until Egypt erased the shame of the Arab's loss of the Six Day War to Israel.

With no progress toward peace possible, Sadat began to say that war was inevitable and that he was prepared to sacrifice one million soldiers in a showdown with Israel. Throughout 1972, and for much of 1973, Sadat threatened war unless the United States forced Israel to accept his interpretation of Resolution 242, the total Israeli withdrawal from all territories taken in 1967.

After Sadat expelled the Russians (20,000 Soviet advisors) for not following through on his request for them to pressure the United States to force Israel to deal with him, he warned in an April 1973 interview that he would renew the war with Israel. But, in fact, no one took him seriously, as President Nixon later said, "The news of the imminent

attack on Israel took us completely by surprise. As recently as the day before, October 5, 1973, the CIA had reported that war in the Middle East was unlikely.”

On October 6, 1973, on Yom Kippur, the holiest day in the Jewish calendar (and during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan), Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated surprise attack against Israel. They in fact had amassed the equivalent of the total forces of NATO in Europe on Israel’s borders. On the Golan Heights, approximately 180 Israeli tanks faced an onslaught of 1,400 Syrian tanks. Along the Suez Canal, fewer than 500 Israeli defenders with only 3 tanks were attacked by 600,000 Egyptian soldiers, backed by 2,000 tanks and 550 aircraft.

At least nine Arab states, including four non–Middle Eastern nations Libya, Sudan, Algeria, and Morocco, actively aided the Egyptian-Syrian war effort. A few months before the attack, Iraq transferred a squadron of Hunter jets to Egypt. During the war, an Iraqi division of some 18,000 men and several hundred tanks was deployed in the central Golan and participated in the October 16 attack against Israeli positions. Iraqi MiGs began operating over the Golan Heights as early as October 8, the third day of the war.

In addition, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait committed men to battle. A Saudi brigade of approximately 3,000 troops was dispatched to Syria, where it participated in fighting along the approaches to Damascus. Also violating Paris’s ban on the transfer of French-made weapons, Libya sent Mirage fighters to Egypt. Algeria sent three aircraft squadrons of fighters and bombers, an armored brigade, and 150 tanks. Approximately 1,000 to 2,000 Tunisian soldiers were positioned in the Nile Delta. Sudan stationed 3,500 troops in southern Egypt, and Morocco sent three brigades to the front lines, including 2,500 men to Syria. Lebanese radar units were used by Syrian air defense forces. Lebanon also allowed Palestinian terrorists to shell Israeli civilian settlements from its territory and Palestinians fought on the Southern Front with the Egyptians and Kuwaitis.

Jordan’s King Hussein, who apparently hadn’t been informed of Egyptian and Syrian war plans, chose not to fight this round, correctly calculating that his forces were vastly inferior to the Israelis’. Hussein’s decision was crucial to Israel’s defense because it freed up forces that would otherwise have had to fight on a third front. Still, the Arab brotherhood required that Hussein contribute to the cause, so he sent two of his best units to Syria. Three Jordanian artillery batteries also participated in the assault, carried out by nearly 100 tanks.

Thrown onto the defensive during the first two days of fighting, Israel mobilized its reserves and began to counterattack. In the south, Israeli forces were having little success in stopping the Egyptian onslaught. Still, the Sinai Desert offered a large buffer zone between the fighting and the heart of Israel. With critical supplies of material and weapons/tanks from the United States, the Israelis were able to mount a determined defense. From October 14 through October 16, the greatest tank battle since the Germans and Russians fought at Kursk in World War II, was fought with roughly 1,000 Israeli and Egyptian tanks. On October 14, Israeli forces destroyed 250 Egyptian tanks in the first 2 hours of fighting. By late afternoon, the Israeli forces had routed the enemy; see Map 11.




The situation was different in the north, where the Syrians had swept across the Golan and could, in short order, threaten Israel's population centers; see Map 12. Consequently, most reserves meant for the Egyptian front were now shifted to the Golan. Because there was

no threat in the central region of Israel from Jordan, the Israelis were able to fully replenish their forces stopped the Syrian advance, forced a retreat, and began their own march forward toward Damascus.

On October 22, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 338 calling for "all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately." The resolution also called for the implementation of Resolution 242. The vote came on the day that Israeli forces cut off and isolated the Egyptian Third Army and were in a position to destroy it.

Israel reluctantly complied with the cease-fire, largely because of U.S. pressure, but also because the next military moves would have



been to attack the two Arab capitals, something few believed would be politically wise. By the end of the fighting, 2,688 Israeli soldiers had been killed. Combat deaths for Egypt and Syria totaled 7,700 and 3,500, respectively.

Although Egypt and its Arab allies lost the war, with Israeli troops prepared to march on Cairo and Damascus, and Egypt's Third Army saved by the United States from annihilation, the Egyptians and Syrians were able to convince themselves that the battle was a victory for them. They had surprised the arrogant Israelis and nearly defeated them. If not for U.S. support, many believed, they would have driven the Jews into the sea. Sadat did not seem to have that as his objective. It was more important for him to erase the humiliation of 1967. As Egyptian chief of staff Sa'ad Shazli, said on October 8, 1973, "The war has retrieved Arab honor." This psychological shift was critical to Sadat's later success in entering into negotiations to reach a peace agreement with Israel

The resulted borders for Israel remained intact as set by the 1967 Six Day War per UN Resolution 242, but the war took a heavy toll on the nation. The invincibility of the IDF was placed into question and many of the leaders in office prior to the war, resigned, including Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan, Israeli heroes of another era.

Throughout this history of Israel's borders evolution, it is obvious that the original framework of cooperation and peace between Arab and Israeli was abandoned to the trash heap of history early on. One has to wonder what great accomplishments these peoples could have achieve collectively if they had followed the vision of King Feisal Hussein and Chaim Weizmann?

1993 Declaration of Principles (The Oslo Accords)

As a footnote to history, even after the 1973 Yom Kippur War, it was nearly a quarter century in 1993 for the PLO to finally agree that Resolutions 242 and 338 should be the basis for negotiations with Israel; they agreed by signing the Declaration of Principles in September 1993, otherwise known as the Oslo Accords. It consisted of four parts:

- A transfer of power and responsibility to the Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza to control their own affairs of governance.
- Permanent status issues such as Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements will not be prejudged or preempted by the interim agreements. Israel retains sole responsibility for foreign affairs, defense and borders, and Jerusalem's status as 'undivided' remains unchanged.
- Israel will be responsible for security along all international borders, and crossing points in to Egypt and Syria, and to have security of Israeli's living in the West Bank and Gaza and in Israeli settlements.

- Implementation Timing:
 - Palestinian self-rule in Gaza and the Jericho area.
 - Palestinian representatives will have responsibility for education, culture, health, social welfare, taxation and tourism
 - Palestinian control for the election of their Council, and provide for a police force for order.
 - Provides for a 'permanent status for continued peace negotiations.

2009 Disengagement From Gaza

To reach the configuration of Israel's borders today, one more event must be discussed, the disengagement of Israel from Gaza. This was labeled a "land for peace" effort, and was considered a bold move by the Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon, to re-start the stalled peace negotiations between the PLO and Israel. At the United States urging, Prime Minister Sharon had determined that the effort would be worth it to bring peace to the region.

The proposal was hotly debated, both in Israel and in many parts of the world. There evolved a consensus that this was an idea whose time had come, and that it would further the peace process. There was serious debate in the Israeli Knesset, and PM Sharon prevailed. By September 2009, all of the Israeli settlers in Gaza had been removed, the synagogues razed, along with residences. Gaza was transferred to the PLO Fatah, which was rapidly undermined and pushed out by Hamas. This radical Palestinian group dismantled a civilian oriented society and replaced it with a militant terrorist society whose whole purpose in existing is the annihilation of the State of Israel. For example, in the Rafah precinct, the residents voted 84% to elect the Hamas terrorist organization into government office to represent them. Thereafter, Hamas took Gaza in a bloody coup against Fatah, throwing them literally off buildings and executing them wherever found. When some Gazans peacefully protested against these acts, Hamas began rounding them up and executing them as well.

It can be said with great certainty, that the Disengagement Plan of 2005 endorsed by President George W. Bush and championed by Ariel Sharon was a complete and abject failure, and will continue as a failure as long as Hamas continues to "govern" Gaza.

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